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USURY -

MARYLAND ANNOTATED CODE, ARTICLE 49 - A

LENDER'S RETENTION OF LOAN RELATED COSTS, UNLESS
EXEMPTED, CONSTITUTES INTEREST - UNPAID BALANCE
IS THAT SUM ACTUALLY OWED BY A BORROWER TO A
LENDER. TRI-COUNTY FED. SAV. & LOAN ASS'N v. LYLE, 280
Md. 69, 371 A.2d 424 (1977).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Historically, the exacting of interest upon a loan has had a long
and checkered existence. The first exhortation against its practice is
at least 2500 years old.1 Yet, even in Biblical times, usury enjoyed a
flourishing traffic and the imaginative entrepreneur even then could
find loopholes in its prohibition. 2 During the Middle Ages, interest in
any form was considered usury, severe penalties being meted out to
those who engaged in the "filthy lucre."' Usury was the source of
Shakespeare's commentary in The Merchant of Venice. No less a
logician than Thomas Aquinas found the practice abhorrent and the
conventional Calvin dealt with it "as an apothecary doth with
poison.

' '4

Today, it is almost impossible to imagine a modern society
without a uniform practice of charging interest on money. Yet its
practice is not left uncontrolled, for statutes in every state regulate
its use. 5 It becomes particularly important, then, for the modern-day
lender to fully comprehend and comply with usury statutes in order
to avoid seemingly innocuous practices which may result in
protracted litigation. This analysis will treat the Tri-County decision
in light of past case history and underlying considerations of policy.
The decisions reached by other jurisdictions on the issues will be
compared to Maryland's position. Finally, some implications of the
Tri-County decision will be discussed as they pertain to the
responsibilities of the Maryland lender.
In April of 1974, Deveroe and Florence Lyle executed a $60,000
note bearing interest at eight percent with the Tri-County Federal
Savings & Loan Association of Waldorf. The loan was to
cover the costs of a residential lot and construction of a house.
Payment of the note was secured by a deed of trust which referred to
the note. The terms of the agreement required an immediate
disbursement to the Lyles of $15,000 which was to cover the
1. Deuteronomy 23:19 (King James): "Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy
brother; usury of money, usury of victuals, usury of any thing that is lent upon
usury."
2. Deuteronomy 23:20 (King James): "Unto a stranger thou mayest lend upon
usury; but unto thy brother thou shalt not lend upon usury." It was thought that

this passage allowed a Christian to exact interest upon a loan made to a Jew but
not to a brother Christian and vice versa.
3. Bernstein, Background of a Gray Area in Law: The Checkered Career of Usury,
51 A.B.A.J. 846 (1965).
4. Id.
5. Lowell, A CurrentAnalysis of the Usury Laws: A National View, 8 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 193 (1971).
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purchase price of the lot. Thereafter, the balance of $45,000 would be
paid in nine separate installments as the construction of the home
progressed. At the time of the loan settlement, a $60,000 check was
endorsed by the Lyles, $15,000 of which was paid over to them; the
remaining $45,000 was deposited in an account maintained by TriCounty in an affiliated bank. 6 Also collected-at the settlement were a
$60 appraisal fee, a $10 credit report fee, and $90 for nine inspection
fees, 7 each of which was subsequently disbursed to another party.
In September, 1974, the Lyles abandoned their construction
plans, and returned the $15,000 to Tri-County. The interest paid by
the Lyles during the period of April to September, 1974 was at all
times computed on the full $60,000 loan. Thereafter, the Lyles
brought suit to recover damages from Tri-County pursuant to Article
49, Section 8 of the Maryland Annotated Code, which provided that
an aggrieved borrower could recover from a usurious lender the
greater amount of $500 or treble the value paid in excess of the
maximum legal rate of charges and interest.'
The Lyles advanced two arguments on their behalf. They
averred that the $60 appraisal fee and the $10 fee for the credit
report constituted interest. Such charges, when combined with the
interest charged on the loan, exceeded eight percent, thereby
rendering the loan usurious. Secondly, the Lyles contended that the
interest charged from April 11 to September 24 on the $45,000, an
amount never subject to their control and never used by them, also
exceeded the maximum legal rate. 9
II.

LOAN-RELATED COSTS

In Tri-County, the Maryland Court of Appeals examined Article
49 of the Maryland Annotated Code. At issue was whether particular
practices engaged in by a lender increased the amount of interest on
a loan. The first issue raised by the Lyles was whether the fees
charged by Tri-County for a credit report and an appraisal
constituted interest under Article 49.10 In Maryland, interest is

defined as "any compensation directly or indirectly imposed by a
6. The $45,000 was deposited to an account maintained by Tri-County at the Bank
of Southern Maryland. Tri-County did maintain a record of "loans in process"
and the balance kept on hand in its account was said to always be equal to or
greater than the total amount committed to loans. Tri-County Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Lyle, 280 Md. 69, 71, 371 A.2d 424, 425 (1977).
7. Since the construction of the house was later abandoned, the $90 sum for
inspection fees ultimately was returned to the Lyles, thus playing no part in the
subsequent action. Tri-County Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Lyle, 280 Md. 69, 71,
371 A.2d 424, 425 (1977); Lyle v. Tri-County Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 33 Md. App.
46, 48, 363 A.2d 642, 643 (1975).
8. "Any person violating the usury provisions of this article shall forfeit three times
the amount of interest and other charges authorized by this article or the sum of
$500.00, whichever is greater." MD. ANN. CODE art. 49, §8 (1972).
9. 280 Md. at 72, 371 A.2d at 425.
10. Id.
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lender for the extension of credit for the use or forbearance of
money."'" A lender is guilty of usury if he collects interest at a rate
greater than the.statutory limits. 1 2 At the time the Lyles' loan was

made, the Maryland Code limited interest to six percent, but eight
percent could be charged if there was an agreement in writing
between the lender and the borrower. 13 As of this writing, a lender
may charge more than eight percent when dealing with small
loans,' 4 consumer loans, 15 secondary mortgage loans, 16 retail credit
8
accounts, 17 and retail installment sales.'
In 1968, largely as a result of home financing demands and a
tight money market, the Maryland General Assembly made
significant changes in Article 49.19 The new legislation specifically
exempted from the definition of interest certain charges paid in
connection with a loan, including late charges, limited prepayment
penalties, fees collected at the direction of the government, and
narrowly prescribed service charges.2 1 In Tri-County, the controv11. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-101(e) (1975).
12. Id. § 12-101(k). At the time Tri-County made the loan, MD. ANN. CODE art. 49, § 6
(1972), defined usury.
13. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49, § 3 (1972).
14. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 12-306 (1977).
15. Id.
16. Id. § 12-404(b) (1975).
17. Id. § 12-505 (1975).
18. Id. § 12-609 to 610 (1975).
19. B. F. Saul v. West End Park North, Inc., 250 Md. 707, 711, 246 A.2d 591, 594
(1968).
20. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49, § 1(b)(1)-(5) (1972) (Ch. 453, § 1, 1968 Md. Laws) (current
version at MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. §12-105 (1977)). (b) The following
compensation or charges may be paid in connection with a loan without
considering it interest and such compensation or charges collected shall not be
interest or deemed usurious under any other provision of this article. (1) A
delinquent or late charge of two dollars ($2.00) or one twentieth (V20th) of the total
amount of any delinquent or late periodic installment of delinquent interest and
principal only, whichever is greater, if so provided in the loan contract; the
delinquent or late charge shall not be imposed more than once for the same
delinquency or lateness; and the delinquent or late charge shall not be imposed
until the delinquency has extended for at least fifteen (15) calendar days. (2) A
charge or prepayment penalty, for a loan secured by a home or combination of
home and business property, agricultural property and commercial loans under
$5,000, only where provided for in the original loan contract, upon prepayment of
the principal amount of the loan provided the charge shall not be more than two
(2) months advance interest on the aggregate amount of all prepayments made
on the loan in any twelve (12) month period, that are in excess of 3313% of the
amount of the original mortgage; no such charge may be imposed after the
expiration of three (3) years from the date the loan was made. (3) Fees or charges
collected at the direction of a government or governmental agency and actually
paid thereto. (4) A service charge, where provided for by contract, on a
commercial lending transaction if money is advanced on the security of
inventory or accounts receivable, for investigation and continuing supervision of
collateral. (5) A service charge, where provided for by contract, may by a
securities broker or a dealer in securities on a transaction if money is advanced
on the security of pledged securities and if services are rendered in the collection
of income thereon, the crediting and disbursement thereof, and the furnishing of
income tax and other information in connection therewith.
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ersy focused upon Article 49, Section 1(b)(6)(c) which stated that
charges not considered interest were "premiums and costs not
retained by the lender for insuring or indemnifying the lender
against loss or liability on or in connection with the loan."' 2' The
court found that, although appraisal and credit report fees were not
specifically exempted from the definition of interest under Article 49,
Section 1, such costs, if connected with the loan, would not be
interest so long as the lender did not retain the fees. 22 If the fees were
retained, they would be deemed interest and would add to the
cumulative interest on the loan. Since the appraisal fee and the fee
for the credit report were paid by Tri-County to others, such charges
could not be considered interest under the statute.
This conclusion reflected the court's earlier decision in B.F. Saul
Co. v. West End Park North, Inc.,23 a 1968 case in which the court
first interpreted the newly enacted language. In Saul, the court
stated that "in the event of any ambiguity as to whether or not a fee
or charge should be included as interest, the determining factor is
whether such charge is retained by the lender and, if so, it should be
treated as interest." 24 The Saul court agreed with the lower ,court's
finding that the intent of the legislature was to prevent unscrupulous
lenders from realizing additional compensation through "padded"
charges. 25 Similarly, in Equitable v. Insurance Comm'r,2 6 the court
relied on the retention rule as formulated in Saul. Equitableinvolved
an insurance premium assigned to a lender as additional collateral
for the repayment of a residential mortgage loan. 27 The court found

that the premiums paid Equitable were solely compensation for the
insurance and that no portion of such premiums was compensation
for the loan. Because Equitable retained the premiums, however, the
premiums were considered interest and within the purview of the
statute.2 8 Writing for the court, Judge Finan observed that the Bill,
which was eventually codified into Section 1(b)(6)(d), did not include
the retention proviso when it was originally introduced. Unlike the
original language of the Bill, the enacted version provided that
insurance premiums
and costs retained by the lender would be
29
deemed interest.

21. Id. 1(b)(6)(c) (1972) (current version at id. § 12-105(c)(3)).
22. 280 Md. at 73, 371 A.2d at 426.
23. 250 Md. 707, 246 A.2d 591 (1968).
24. Id. at 723, 246 A.2d at 601.
25. Id. at 724, 246 A.2d at 602.
26. 251 Md. 143, 246 A.2d 604 (1968).
27. Equitable dealt with MD. ANN. CODE art. 49, § 1(b)(6)(d), whereas the decision in
Tri-County was based upon id. § 1(b)(6)(c). Although the subsections dealt with
different types of loan-related costs, the retention prohibition was included in

both.

28. 251 Md. at 148, 246 A.2d at 607.
29. Id.
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In both cases, the court stated that charges retained by the
lender constituted interest unless they were specifically exempted
under Article 49. If the lender acts as a middleman between the
borrower and independent parties who perform the service, the fees
will not be interest.30
With the retention rule, Maryland has exalted convenience over
logic. The mere fact that a lender retains service fees is a
questionable standard for determining what constitutes interest
charges. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, most
jurisdictions hold that the payment by a borrower of reasonable
expenses incident to a loan, when made in good faith and not as
consideration for the loan, does not constitute interest. 31 In these
jurisdictions, the element of retention does not per se render such
costs interest. Typically, the charge must be confined to a specific
service or expense incidental to the loan in such a way as to preclude
its use as a device through which additional interest on the loan may
be exacted. 32 The underlying rationale is that expenses incidental to
the administration of the loan, which furnish the lender satisfactory
security for its repayment, cannot be considered compensation for
the use of the money borrowed. 33 If the lender has at its disposal
in-house personnel who are capable of performing these services, it is
only reasonable for the lender to provide the services and exact
reasonable compensation for them.
Most jurisdictions have not adopted the retention language
found in Maryland. They generally determine, under the facts of
each case, whether a charge is a legitimate loan-related expense: 34
Where a transaction is in reality a loan of money, whatever
may be its form, and the lender charges for the use of his
money a sum in excess of interest at the legal rate, by
whatever name the charge may be called, the transaction
will be held to be usurious. The law considers the substance
and not the mere form or outward appearance of the
transaction. 35
30. 280 Md. at 73. 371 A.2d at 426.
31. Klett v. Security Acceptance Co., 38 Cal. 2d 770, 242 P.2d 873 (1952); Ex Parte
Fuller, 15 Cal. 2d 425, 102 P.2d 321 (1940); Haines v. Commercial Mortgage Co.,
200 Cal. 609, 254 P. 956 (1927), reh. denied, 255 P. 805 (1927); Iowa Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Heidt, 107 Iowa 297, 77 N.W. 1050 (1899); Hansen v. Duvall, 333 Mo. 59,
62 S.W.2d 732 (1933); Silver Homes, Inc. v. Marx & Bensdorf, Inc., 206 Tenn. 361,
333 S.W.2d 810 (1960); Chakales v. Djiovanides, 161 Va. 48, 170 S.E. 848 (1933);
see cases collected in Annot., 105 A.L.R. 795 (1936); Annot., 63 A.L.R. 820 (1929);
Annot., 21 A.L.R. 797 (1922).
32. Klett v. Security Acceptance Corp., 38 Cal. 2d 770, 242 P.2d 873 (1952).
33. Id.
34. Banks v. Flint, 54 Ark. 40, 14 S.W. 769 (1890); Klett v. Security Acceptance Co., 38
Cal 2d 770, 242 P.2d 873 (1952); Schmid v. City Nat'l Bank, 132 Tex. 115, 114
S.W.2d 854 (1938); Chakales v. Djiovanides, 161 Va. 48, 170 S.E. 848 (1933). See
generally Danforth, Usury: Applicability to Collateral Fees and Charges, 16
S.D.L. REV. 52 (1971).

35. Ripple v. Mortgage Corp., 193 N.C. 422, 424, 137 S.E. 156, 158 (1927).
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The form vs. substance approach compels a court to consider the
nature of the fee, not its recipient. Several basic considerations, by
no means consistently applied, often appear persuasive in such
cases. The purpose of usury law is, after all, to regulate the amount
of money charged for the use or forbearance of a certain sum. The
lender should be able to relate any charge in excess of permissible
interest to actual out-of-pocket expenses incidental to the loan; such
expense should be of the type commonly incurred and accepted in
the lending community for services related to administering the
loan.36 The expense should be reasonable in relation to the service
rendered. 37 The borrower should agree in advance to the payment of
the expense. 38 If the lender can satisfy these criteria, courts in most
jurisdictions will find that the lender has operated in good faith and,
39
therefore, the charges will not be deemed interest.
One clear message of Tri-County is that the mere retention of
any costs not specifically exempted will be dispositive of the issue.
The lender will be discouraged from providing appraisals, credit
reports, and similar services since, if he is to be compensated for
them, he must charge a lower rate of interest on the loan in order to
keep the cumulative interest within the legal rate. It is not difficult,
however, to imagine devices by which lenders may attempt to avoid
the retention rule and benefit from the service. Nor is it difficult to
predict the questions which may have to be litigated. For instance, if
the borrower pays the lender for a loan-related cost and the lender in
turn pays the amount to a third party who performed the service,
does the lender "retain" the charge within the meaning of the statute
if the third party returns a portion of the cost to the lender as a
"finder's fee" or some equally euphemistic designation? If the lender
sets up a subsidiary corporation which provides loan-related
services, can it truly be said that the lender does not profit from the
loan-related service? These questions have yet to be addressed by the
Maryland courts.
Maryland's retention rule may raise as many questions as it
answers. Certainly, as an expedient formula, it has much to
recommend it. Simply, if a lender retains loan-related costs, they will
be considered interest. To that extent, the rule provides certainty in
commercial transactions without initially having to determine

36. Turner v. Younker Bros., Inc., 210 N.W.2d 550 (Iowa 1973).
37. Altherr v. Wilshire Mortgage Corp., 104 Ariz. 59, 448 P.2d 859 (1969); Kroll v.
Windsor, 259 Minn. 200, 107 N.W.2d 53 (1961); Brown v. Robinson, 224 N.Y. 301,
120 N.E. 694 (1918), reh. denied, 225 N.Y. 638, 121 N.E.857 (1918); see cases
collected in Annot., 91 A.L.R. 2d 1386 (1963).
38. Pushee v. Johnson, 123 Fla. 305, 166 So. 847 (1936); Brown v. Robinson, 224 N.Y.
301, 120 N.E. 694 (1918); Life Ins. Co. of Virginia v. Smathers, 212 N.C. 40, 192
S.E. 851 (1937); Rossberg v. Hoelsapple, 128 Utah 544, 260 P.2d 563 (1953).
39. It is the element of good faith with which many courts are chiefly concerned.
E.g., Siebert v. Hall, 63 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1933).
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whether the costs are reasonable, as in those states which follow the
ad hoc approach. Such certainty diminishes possible litigation. But
as the earlier queries suggest, the question of when a lender
"retains" such costs may very well present an area of substantial
disagreement. Further refinement of the retention rule will be
necessary before the status of such charges is definitively established.
III. THE "BALANCE"
The second issue presented to the court was whether Tri-County,
by charging eight percent interest on the full amount of the loan
from the date of settlement, while holding $45,000
in its own
40
account, was liable for usury under Maryland law.
Article 49, Section 3 of the Maryland Annotated Code states, in
relevant part:
Interest may be charged not in excess of the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum simple interest on the unpaid
balance, except that interest may be charged at the rate not
in excess of eight percent (8%) per annum simple interest on
the unpaid balance under an agreement in writing
between
41
the lender and the borrower. (Emphasis added.)
The Lyles argued that the $45,000, which had not been disbursed to
them at the time of the loan settlement, did not constitute part of the
"unpaid balance" and that, therefore, interest collected on the total
$60,000 exceeded the rate of interest allowed under Article 49,
Section 3.42 Tri-County contended that the $45,000 was part of the
"unpaid balance," since it was at all times ear-marked for the Lyles
and committed by Tri-County for the Lyles' use and benefit. 43
The issue was one of first impression in Maryland under the
1968 statute. The court found that "balance" clearly meant "that
which is owed by a borrower to a lender. ' 44 So long as the $45,000
remained in the sole control of Tri-County, and was not subject to
the control of the Lyles, interest on the balance was usurious,
because the $45,000 was not, and could not be, a part of the
"balance" of the loan to the Lyles. 45

40. 280 Md. at 72, 371 A.2d at 425.
41. MD ANN. CODE art. 49, § 3 (1972) (Ch. 453, § 1 1968 Md. Laws) (current version at
MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-103 (1977)).
42. Brief for Appellee, Tri-County Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Lyle, 280 Md. 69, 371
A.2d 424 (1977).
43. Brief for Appellant, Tri-County Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Lyle, 280 Md. 69, 371
A.2d 424 (1977).
44. 280 Md. at 76, 371 A.2d at 427.
45. Id.
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The word "balance" was construed in Thiliman v. Shadrick,46 in

which the issue was whether "balance," as used in an affidavit
accompanying a declaration of assumpsit, was sufficient in itself to
comply with statutory provisions requiring a statement of the
particulars of the alleged indebtedness. Writing for the court, Judge
McSherry found that the word was unambiguous, stating:
Inasmuch as a balance is claimed, it is perfectly evident that
there must be a debit and a credit side to an account from
which that balance was taken. The balance so produced is
not an account, but the result of an account. It bears to an
account precisely the same relation
that a conclusion does to
47
the premises of a sylogism.

The court distinguished several cases relied on by Tri-County. In
both White Eagle Polish American Building & Loan Ass'n v. Hart
Miller Islands Co.,48 and New Baltimore Loan & Say. Ass'n v.

Tracey,49 the sums were held by the lender subject to certain
conditions while interest accrued unabated. But in both cases, unlike
the instant case, the sums were credited to the mortgagors. While the
factual situation in Bettum v. Montgomery Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n 5° was closer to that in Tr-County, the Bettum loan had been
made before Article 49, Section 3 became effective, and so the case
51
was inapposite.
The court's interpretation of "balance" explicitly required a
determination of who exercised control over the $45,000. Having the
discretion to withhold or pay progress payments to the contractor
evidences control of the sum. In such a transaction, the lender
retains this discretion in order to see that the house - the lender's
collateral - is constructed in a workmanlike manner. It was not
merely the exercise of control by Tri-County that the court found
persuasive. Equally important to the holding was the total lack of
control over the $45,000 by the Lyles: they could make no use of the
money until construction actually began. The account in which the
money was deposited, although a non-interest bearing account, 52 was
in the name of Tri-County; 53 Tri-County's control was exclusive.

46. 69 Md. 528, 16 A. 138 (1888).
47. Id. at 531, 16 A. at 140, cited in Lyle v. Tri-County Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 33
Md. App. 46, 54, 363 A.2d 642, 647 (1975).
48. 168 Md. 199, 178 A. 214 (1934).
49. 142 Md. 211, 120 A. 441 (1923).
50. 262 Md. 360, 277 A.2d 600 (1971).
51. In Bettum, the loan transaction took place in 1966. The applicable statute at the
time read: "Interest may be charged or deducted at the rate of six percent per
annum and the same may be calculated according to the standard laid down in
Rowlett's tables." MD. ANN. CODE art. 49, § 1 (1957). Thus, an interpretation of
"unpaid balance" proved unnecessary.

52. 280 Md. at 76, 371 A.2d at 427.
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The test for usury adopted by the Maryland Court of Appeals in
Tri-County was that interest must be computed on the amount owed
to the lender, that is, the "unpaid balance." In the usury statutes of
most states, the term "unpaid balance" does not appear.5 4 The
approach taken by these jurisdictions follows from the proposition
that interest should only be charged on sums made available to the
borrower. In most jurisdictions, if, as a condition of making the loan,
the borrower is required to leave part of the money on deposit with
the lender, the transaction is usurious if the interest paid for the loan
amounts to more than legal interest on the sum actually available
for the use of the borrower.5 5 This is certainly true if the amount so
retained is used to secure the loan.56 However, a casual or brief delay
in handing over a portion of the sum to the borrower does not render
a transaction usurious in the absence of a usurious intent.5 7 Indeed,
at least one court has said that when it does not appear for what
purpose a portion of the loan is retained by the lender, it will not be
deemed interest without a finding-of usurious intent.5 8 In addition,
when a transaction is non-usurious, a borrower cannot render it
usurious by a voluntary act or omission.5 9 In one opinion, based on a
strict reading of a usury statute, a Virginia court decided that the
lender's retention of part of the proceeds of a loan did not constitute
usury, but merely represented an unlawful withholding of money. 6°
Florida is one state that, in the absence of specific statutory
language, has consistently held that such a retention constitutes
usury. In Mindlin v. Davis,6 1 the court stated that since time, as well
as the amount of principle, is a factor in the calculation of interest,
the retention of a substantial portion of the loan without a
corresponding abatement of interest on the amount retained has the
effect of substantially increasing the percentum of interest on the

53. Id.
54. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1916-3 (West 1978). FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.02 (West 1977).
55. 45 AM. JUR. 2d, Interest and Usury § 113 (1969). The court of appeals cited to
some length this section in its opinion. Tri-County Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Lyle, 280 Md. 69, 74, 371 A.2d 424, 426. See Pellerin Laundry Mach. Sales Co., v.
Hague, 219 F. Supp. 629 (W.D. Ark. 1963); Planters' Nat'l Bank v. Wysong &
Miles Co., 177 N.C. 380, 99 S.E. 199, cert. denied, 250 U.S. 665 (1919).
56. Vee Bee Service Co. v. Household Fin. Corp., 51 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Sup. Ct. 1944),
aff'd, 55 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1945).
57. 45 AM. JUR. 2d, Interest and Usury § 113 (1969); see cases collected in Annot., 12
A.L.R. 1422 (1921).
58. Ray v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 207 N.C. 654, 178 S.E. 89 (1935).
59. Atlantic Life Ins. Co. of Richmond, Va. v. Wolf, 54 A.2d 641 (D.C. 1947). The
court stated; "A loan transaction which would be free from usury if the loan
were paid at the agreed maturity date ig not rendered usurious by the borrower's
voluntary repayment of the loan before maturity, even though, by reason of such
repayment, the amount of interest received by the lender exceeds lawful interest
computed to the day the loan is paid." Id. at 643.
60. Chakales v. Djiovanides, 161 Va. 48, 170 S.E. 848 (1933).
61. 74 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1954).
62. Id. at 793.
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actual amount advanced by the lenders and received by the
borrowers. 62 The facts in Williamson v. Clark,63 citing Mindlin as
controlling, were very similar to those in Tri-County. The mortgagees exacted interest in advance on a construction mortgage,
retained the principle, and advanced it only by installments when
required to meet the creditors' bills. Because this procedure
materially increased the interest rate, the transaction was deemed
usurious.

64

California reached the same conclusion when a loan was

made available to the borrower only in progress installments, and
the sum was held subject to conditions, some of which were not
65
under the borrower's control.
In order to avoid the possibility that a borrower will avail
himself of a usury theory either as a cause of action or as a defense
to a lender's action to collect interest, it will be necessary for
Maryland lenders to bear in mind the import of Tri-County. Only
those funds made available to the borrower and not exclusively
controlled by the lender may be considered interest-generating loans.
This, however, does not preclude the lender from controlling the
allocation of the amount by subjecting it to certain prescribed
conditions. The court did not say that the lender must surrender
total control of the amount, or that the borrower must have complete
and immediate access. A fair reading of the decision requires that for
a rate of interest to be usurious, it must have been computed on the
sum over which the lender had total control and the borrower had
none. Given this reading, even partial control by the borrower would
seem to be enough to preclude the charge of usury, when, for
66
instance, the amount is placed in escrow.
IV. SOME ALTERNATIVES
Today, the type of construction loan agreement found in TriCounty, a progress payment contract is handled one of two ways. 6 7
The first approach is for the lender to disburse only those amounts
required by the loan agreement and limit the amount subject to
interest to that money actually disbursed. If the lender exacts
interest on the amount of the full loan, while retaining some portion,
he will run afoul of Article 49, Section 3 if the total rate of interest
exceeds the legal limit. One detrimental feature of this approach,
however, is that it requires the lender to segregate large sums of
63.
64.
65.
66.

120 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 1960).
Id. at 639.
Penziner v. West American Finance Co., 133 Cal. 578, 24 P.2d 501 (1933).
The court said as much when it stated: "At no time was [the amount] under the
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held in escrow by others for their account, even though subject to restrictions."
280 Md. at 73, 371 A.2d at 426.
67. Interview with Charles H. Kresslein, Jr., President of the Maryland Savings and
Loan League, in Baltimore, Maryland (Feb. 9, 1978).
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money, at all times prepared to meet his contractual obligations,
while realizing no interest on the dormant funds.
A better solution used by many Maryland lenders today is to
place the sum in a separate escrow account. The escrow agent keeps
the amount until the performance of a condition or the happening of
a certain event. Then, the funds are delivered to the borrower.
Although the lender has surrendered its control of the money, its
security for the loan is nevertheless protected. Interest may then be
charged on the entire amount without subjecting the lender to a
possible violation of Article 49, Section 3.
In such a procedure, the escrow agent is usually affiliated with
68
the lender, as in the case of a director of a bank, or house counsel.
Whether a lender's use of an affiliated escrow agent creates complete
lender control and negates borrower access may be decided soon by
the Maryland Court of Special Appeals. On December 28, 1977,
Judge Walter R. Haile of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County had
occasion to interpret Tri-County in Hoffman v. Key Say. & Loan
Ass'n.69 In Hoffman, a check representing the sum loaned was
endorsed by the borrowers and placed in a trust account subject to
the control of the trustees who were officers, agents, and employees
of the lender. 70 The issue was whether there was a violation of the
Maryland usury law, when the amount loaned was deposited in the
lender's institution under the name of the lender-affiliated escrow
agent. Judge Haile reasoned that if the money was not in the sole
71
control of the lender, the rationale of Tri-County would not apply.
Since the trust agreement bound the trustees to make advances upon
the satisfaction of certain conditions, the money deposited was not
under the exclusive control of the lender.7 2 Judge Haile concluded:
It is not reasonable to infer that because the co-trustees were
officers of the association that they would necessarily be
acting under the control and direction of the association and
on its behalf. It is more reasonable to infer that the cotrustees would have acted 73in accordance with their duties
under the trust agreement.
The trust agreement provided the necessary control to the borrower,
thus distinguishing Tri-County in which the lender's control was
exclusive.
Judge Haile's conclusion, however, may very well be an example
of elevating form over substance. The issue is whether a trust
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No. 96103/108/291 (Balt. Co. Cir. Ct. Dec. 28, 1977).
Id. at 7.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.

372

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 7

agreement per se always operates to place enough distance between
the loan and the lender to place the sum out of the exclusive control
of the lender. Although Judge Haile decided the issue in the
affirmative, serious questions remain. The terms of the trust
agreement may be so advantageous to the lender that, as a practical
matter, the lender has as much control of the sum than had he
retained it without such an agreement. For instance, a trust
agreement may provide that a director of the bank will act as
trustee. Additionally, the agreement may contain an exculpatory
clause relieving the trustee of any liability for negligent handling of
funds during his tenure. The agreement may further provide that the
sum will remain in a non-interest bearing account within the
lender's institution until such time as the conditions of the trust
agreement are fulfilled. When such terms are included within a trust
agreement, what is left of the fiduciary responsibility a trustee owes
to a borrower? Moreover, it is difficult to imagine a limit on the
variety of such advantageous terms a lender may foist upon a
borrower.
While it is true that the trustee has an obligation to the borrower
with regard to the escrow funds, the trust agreement adds nothing to
the underlying contract; the lender is legally obligated to disburse
the amount with or without the existence of the trust agreement. It
would be fatuitous to believe that a trust agreement so constructed
adds anything to the borrower's control, and one must strain to
conclude that such an arrangement, irrespective of its terms, always
takes the amount out of the exclusive control of the lender. If the
court is genuinely concerned with the substance of the transaction, it
may be necessary to go behind the form of the trust agreement in
order to determine its particular provisions and how those provisions
relate to control of the loan. Hoffman may present an opportunity to
the court of special appeals to clarify the issue and determine under
what circumstances a trust agreement shields a lender from a charge
of usury.
V. CONCLUSION
The practical effect of the Tri-County decision, with regard to
loan-related charges retained by the lender, should not be exaggerated. Since the Saul decision, Maryland lenders have been acutely
aware of the dangers inhering in loan-related services. Tri-County
only reaffirmed Maryland's position that such service fees would be
considered interest on the loan if retained by the lender. On the other
hand, the lender's retention of part of the loan by way of a trust
agreement presents a potential issue for future litigation. The trust
agreement has long been a feature of Maryland construction loan
transactions. If the court of special appeals determines that a trust
agreement per se does not protect the lender from a charge of usury,
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lending institutions state-wide may be forced to significantly alter
existing policies and practices. Those lenders who presently exact
interest on the total amount of the loan from the date of settlement
by way of a trust agreement may be forced to limit interest on sums
actually disbursed to the borrower. In any event, Maryland lenders
and borrowers alike need a prompt clarification of the issue raised
by the Tri-County court.
Jeffrey J. Plum

